Alphen, Netherlands. 21 January.
It is being called the “soft underbelly of Europe”, an entire
sub-continent from the Maghreb to the Middle East that stretches down to the
transitional zone between Saharan and Sub-Saharan Africa known as the Sahel
region and beyond to Nigeria. It
encompasses both Algeria where the attack inspired by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) took place on BP’s In Amenas gas plant, and Mali where French forces are
currently struggling to contain a heavily-armed Islamist/Tuareg insurgency,
many of whom were Gadhafi's mercenaries in Libya’s recent civil war. In fact, the phrase ‘soft underbelly of
Europe’ was first coined by Winston Churchill in November 1942 to counter
growing pressure from Roosevelt and Stalin for what would have been a
disastrously premature Second Front against the Axis powers in Europe during World War Two. And, clearly, the region in question is not
Europe. Therefore, before sustained
action is taken the events in both Mali and Algeria must be placed in context
and blanket terms avoided that too often reflect a lack of real understanding. What is happening is important but this is not the start another global war on
terror.
Two critical factors
must now be gripped. First, the Tuareg
uprising is an unintended consequence of the Western-supported toppling of
Libya’s Gadhafi, fuelled by the small and heavy arms now awash across the
region which as a result is in danger of tipping the balance between state and
anti-state forces in Mali. Second, the nature of
the insurgency and its links or otherwise to the strategic brand that is Al
Qaeda and the so-called “global jihadist consciousness” need to be
better understood. The links may or may
not exist and may or may not be strong but it would be a mistake to create a
monster where none exists by dignifying criminality with some kind of
religious, ideological grand strategy.
Clearly, Islamist
groups and criminals seeking to exploit and expropriate Islam have been growing
rich in recent years though the retreat of the state across the northern half
of Africa. And, there will be some
groups who clearly see the creation of ungoverned spaces as
potential bases to attack the West to legitimise their activities in the eyes
of followers. However, just as the
threat of global jihad was exaggerated post 911 it must not be exaggerated
here. If that happens the likelihood is
that the West again will craft another failed strategy that again uses a hammer
to crack a nut, and in so doing strengthens the nut.
The strategic aim of
policy should be clear; the preservation of the state in the region with aid focussed
on the reconstruction of state apparatus.
This is a struggle between the state and the anti-state and it is a
vital Western interest to ensure states survive.
The strategy must in
turn have six elements all of which should have been learnt from experience in
Afghanistan. First, a
consistent intelligence picture must be developed across the region to better
understand the extent and nature of the insurgency, the key movers and shakers
and what if any links exist to outside forces, such as Saudi-based
funding. This will enable the
intelligent use of force and resource over time and distance critical to
strategy. Second, Western elite military
forces should be held as a mobile strike and support reserve to deal with
specific crises and thus prevent state collapse. Third,
local (police), regional and national forces must be trained, equipped and
properly paid to provide both the vital legitimacy and mass of boots on the
ground to better stabilise and reconstruct.
This will help disaggregate insurgencies and criminality locally by helping
to break any link between local grievances and AQIM that may exist.
Fourth, a
detailed mapping of aid activities must start with a focus on those programmes that deliver
results via a strategic and co-ordinated aid policy with all concerned governments
pooling their efforts. EU this is a time
for you to pull your finger out and for once turn theory and talk into
successful practice. Fifth, establish a
new aid architecture that reinforces state legitimacy and efficiency via a Contact Group that incorporates Western and regional governments, African Union, Arab
League, together with the EU, UN and World Bank. Sixth, establish a proper auditing and
reporting system built on sound output (not input) metrics for measuring aid performance and distinguish between aid (short-term) and develpment (medium-to-long term). Too much Western taxpayer’s money has been
squandered over the past decade by peppering with money dysfunctional and
under-performing programme in an attempt by governments to pretend heat was
light.
The French were right
to intervene in Mali to prevent a Rwanda/Sierra Leone-type genocide. However, Western governments, in particular
European governments, must now pause, think, plan and only then act. The many lessons that have surely been learnt
in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan must now be systematically applied in North
Africa and beyond.
Something must be done; but 'it' must be done properly.
Julian Lindley-French
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